RIOT CONTROL

new tactics.
The rioting last summer was a horrifying preview of what could happen to our cities in the next few months. Racing disaster, police departments have started crash training programs in mob control, and spent vast sums on anti-riot equipment. When the fuse is lit again, they are ready to fight.

THE FIRES OF SUMMER

Hamlet's famous, "If ever you disturb our streets again, your lives shall pay the forfeit of the peace."—ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 1, Scene 1

In his office in Newark, N.J., Police Director Dominick A. Spina keeps nearly 100 automatics and revolvers, collected over a lifetime of police work and soldiering. Locked in glass-toped cases, these handguns are for display only. In the corner behind Spina's desk stands a weapon intended for use. It is a short-barreled 12-gauge repeating shotgun—the traditional riot gun policemen use to put down disorder in the streets.

"We have had our riot," said Director Spina, a compact, square-jawed man who wears on his right hand a skull-faced silver ring that he took from a German SS officer in World War II. "And I can tell you this"—he spoke the words very slowly and very positively—"it will not happen here again."

"We weren't ready last time," said Spina, whose police force was sharply criticized by a governor's commission for its handling of the July riots. "We didn't have the protection we needed for our officers, nor the weapons. We've got them now, and we will use them. We will do everything humanly possible to keep a riot from breaking out. But if trouble starts, we won't make the mistake we made before. We won't waste five hours bugging people to go home peacefully. Fifteen minutes after the crowd starts gathering we'll have one hundred men there, armed with shotguns. We will disperse the crowd, and our patrols will keep it dispersed. They can shout and yell all they want—that's their right. But the minute the first brick goes through a window,
Lethal ghetto cocktail recipe ends with the curt instruction: 'Light rag; throw bottle at Whitey.'

We'll start making arrests. This time there won't be any looking around.

Spina's blunt warning reflects the mood of many lawmen today. No mayor or police commander would seriously question the basic findings of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders—that vast projects, "compassionate, massive and sustained," must quickly get under way to wipe out the inequities that cause riots. But they agree also with the commission's observation that violence and destruction must be ended, and that the community cannot, and will not, tolerate mob rule. There must be peace in the streets.

At the moment there seems little likelihood that there will be peace in the streets this summer, without the repression police measures that the commission's report deplores. As the police arm and armor themselves against the possibility of impending violence, the citizens of the ghetto, banding Black Power leader Ray Brown's admiration.

"Get you some fire," have been acquiring weapons of their own. After Newark, a riot in Plainfield, N.J., was exacerbated when state police searched houses in a hunt for stolen barrels. Since then, Plainfield Police Chief George Campbell reported to a Senate Committee that a huge arsenals of carbines, machine guns, and other weapons had been stolen from nearby arsenals. "The loss," said Chief Campbell, "constitutes a terrible danger.

Black Power leaders have also been diligent in devising their own homemade devices for harassing Whitey and his cops. The rioter's tactics are hit and run. His principal weapon the Molotov cocktail. In nearly every major city, police intelligence agents have turned up homemade incendiary devices giving detailed instructions for making these simple firebombs, often including the curt final instruction, "Light rag; throw bottle at Whitey." Ingeny in making incendiary devices goes far beyond this, however. At the convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Kansas City last September, Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, the provost marshal general, demonstrated more than a dozen homemade incendiary or explosive gadgets currently being manufactured in the ghetto. There was also a homemade bow for propelling fire arrows, and a ghetto recipe for mixing "napalm" out of gasoline, sugar and animal blood.

The police and their backup force, the National Guard, are less concerned about ghetto weapons and tactics than they are about the weakness that was revealed in their own organizations when the explosions of arson, looting and murder swept the nation during the tragic summer of 1967. Then, in 72 cities in 22 states, trivial incidents, unimportant in themselves but reflecting the bitter anger and frustration of the Negro, flared into spontaneous and unplanned violence. When the summer ended 83 persons had been killed—nine of them law officers, most of the rest Negroes, including many non-rioters. 1,867 others, nearly half of them policemen, had been injured, and property valued at many millions of dollars had been destroyed.

As the shooting stopped and the fires died down, stunned cities from coast to coast took stock of what they had learned. For both the police and the National Guard, the lessons were embarrassing. In Newark's great riot, the mob was able to leave the streets only after the hand-nosed state police had moved in to make mass arrests. In Detroit, where 43 died, it was the steady, disciplined airborne troops of the regular Army, many of them Negroes, who finally brought the mob under control.

From these experiences the police and the National Guard each learned a lesson. The police, trained to work singly or in pairs, discovered that...
they were neither psychologically prepared nor physically equipped to function as a semi-military unit, which is what riot control demands. They lacked the command structure, the weapons, the knowledge of mass-formation tactics, the equipment to disperse or contain an unruly mob. The Guard units, on the other hand, were too heavily armed for warfare in the streets, where an M-1 bullet fired at a rioter may rip through thin-walled houses to kill an innocent person blocks away. With only two hours of perfunctory riot-control training behind them, they were no more effective than the city police. Panic, often out of contact with their commanders, they were unable to apply selective, restrained force against a fast-moving mob, in which active arsonists, looters and snipers mingled with shooting, jumping outlanders, most of whom actually did nothing wrong, but were carried away by the turbulent mass around them.

At hastily organized seminars in Trenton, N.J., and Chicago, police and Guard personnel hashed over the weaknesses revealed, particularly in the ordeal of Newark and Detroit, the two cities hit hardest. It soon became clear that lack of police intelligence about the "enemy"'s plans was responsible for many of the errors. "We thought we were light-years ahead of other cities in our relations with our Negro citizens," said Detroit's Police Commissioner Ray Girardin. "Suddenly we found we had a shooting war on our hands, and we didn't know how to handle it." In Newark the police were somewhat more aware of danger. For weeks a dissident Negro group calling itself Blackman's Volunteer Army of Liberation had been disrupting meetings of the city's education and planning boards. With a Black Power conference scheduled to begin there within a week, the state police had set up a Newark command post, from which they could work in cooperation with the local cops.

"Then," growled Col. David B. Kelly, head of the state police, "the goddamn politicians passed around and didn't call on us until the mob was running wild."

In New Haven, Conn., a month later, the political powers did not make the same mistake. Rioting began on Saturday night, August 19. By Sunday afternoon, Mayor Richard C. Lee had called in the state police and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. In the next four days 534 persons were arrested. No shots were fired. No looters was cited; no charges of police brutality were brought. On the other hand, New Haven's population is 25 percent non-white, while over 80 percent of Newark's is non-white.

Surprise, coupled with the size and fury of the quickly forming mobs, caused great confusion in the riot-hit cities. In Newark, 1,850 persons were arrested, 900 of them in one day; Detroit housed 7,231. Neither was prepared to handle such a deluge, and all booking and detention procedures broke down. Prisoners gave false names and changed clothes in jail to conceal their identity. In court, afterward, few charges could be pressed, because it was often impossible for the arresting officer to connect an individual with a specific crime. In the future Newark will solve this problem, as New Haven solved it, by having Polaroid cameras issued to the arrest teams so that pictures of the men, the prisoner and his loot can be made at the time of arrest.

In both Newark and Detroit dozens of police cars were put out of service when roosters flying broken glass at tires, and in Newark communications broke down when the high-powered radios of the state police drowned out the walkie-talkies of the local police. Then, when the local cops tried to telephone headquarters, they found the switch-boards jammed. New codes for transmitting orders over police radios had to be hastily devised, for rioters monitoring police frequencies were able to anticipate every move the cops made.

Streets--into an awareness of its unreadiness to fight a war in the streets, the Guard, under direct orders from the President, launched a crash program to step up its riot-control training from two hours to 32 hours. At Fort Belvoir, Va., and Fort Gordon, Ga., regular Army troops simulate riots and demonstrate traditional control methods to both Guard commanders and the police. Meanwhile, determined that they shall not again be taken by surprise, cities across the nation are:

- Sending police undercover men into the ghettos to look, listen and gather information on what the black militant leaders are saying—with special efforts being made to track down the sources of the wild rumors that often incite riots.
- Stockpiling arms, ammunition and tear gas, and spending huge sums on body armor, helmets and special armored vehicles needed to protect police officers attempting to control an unruly mob.
- Training men in the tactics the military uses to put down civil disorders—the massed formations of armed men that can dispense or contain a mob, and the special techniques of killing or capturing a sniper without unduly endangering the innocent.
- Passing new ordinances giving mayors and city managers greater powers to set curfews, to seal off certain sections of the city from traffic, to close up businesses selling guns and ammunition, liquor or gasoline in areas threatened by a riot.
- Keeping the Department of Justice informed of the mood and temper of their minorities by reporting every morning to a special riot-control room in Washington, where phones and Teletypes are manned 24 hours a day. A computer attempts to digest all this information, with a view to predicting riots before they start.
- Holding command-post exercises with their "allies," the state police and the National Guard, meshing their communications nets, assigning areas of responsibility and setting up the chain of command that will take over when these forces come in to back up the local police.
- Providing the Department of the Army with detailed battle plans. The Army in turn is co-
ordinating its plans with those of the cities and
stockpiling riot-control equipment at strategic
depots from which it can be airlifted to any threat-
ened city. And the National Guard is tying in its
plans with those of the Army, the state police and
the city governments.

In the atmosphere of tension that has prevai-
lend since last summer, salesmen of arms and armor
have found themselves welcome in police stations
across the land. Before the riot at Newark, Police
Director Spina was greatly interested in a man-
yac, program of police-community relations. In
the wake of the troubles, he hastily equipped his
1,100 policemen with $200,000 worth of battleproof
helmets, armored cars, anti-sniper rifles and "all
the tear gas we could ever need." In Detroit, Police
Commissioner Girardin asked for nearly a million
dollars' worth of similar equipment. His request
for armored cars was turned down, but he received
permission to train and use 1,000 civilian volun-
teers who would serve as an auxiliary force to the
city's 300 policemen, relieving them of the duty of
standing armed guard over public utilities and
public buildings.

All across the country, cities have laid in vast
supplies of anti-riot hardware. Chicago spent $168,000
on three helicopters to serve as airborne command
posts during riots, and to survey rooftops for caches of bricks,
bottles and concrete blocks. New York City bought 5,000 riot helmets at a cost
of $100,000. In Virginia the state police ordered six armored cars costing $80,000 each, although the
Advocacy Commission warned that displays of ex-
cessive force-- tanks, for example--would prob-
able only inflame the passions of the crowd. In Los
Angeles the sheriff's department thrifty built its
own armored car for $7,000 by modifying an old
water-supply tank, and in Philadelphia, Commissi-
oner Frank L. Rizzo requested two armored vehi-
cles, but was turned down by the mayor.

Throughout the country, suppliers of police equip-
ment report booming sales of riot guns, handcuffs
and tear gas.

These frantic preparations represent less a bully-
boy menace toward the Negro minority than an
ulterior threat, a nervous jumpiness, an almost
pathological fear that unless the city stands
armed and ready, it may be destroyed.

There is something of the cities fear still more
than a repetition of 1967. Despite the violence, the
passions and the terror of last summer's riots, police
and city administrators now acknowledge that they
were far less bloody than they might have been.

They were not the classic "race riots" in which
white men and black men fight each other in the
streets as they have done a dozen times or more
since the Civil War. Confined, in the main, to Ne-
gro areas, they were confrontations by proxy, in
which the black man did battle, not with Whitey
but with Whitey's agents--the policemen, the fire-
men and the white owners of slum stores. But lur-
ing in the back of every police commander's mind
today is the cold dread of what might happen if
some future uprising should break through his bar-
ticades--the nightmare vision of Negro mobs loot-
ing and burning on Whitey's side of town, while
armed whites counterattack into the Negro ghettos.

This is the specter that still hangs over Newark,
where white vigilantes have armed themselves,
openly declaring their intention to defend their
homes and places of business if violence erupts in
that city again. It haunt's Detroit, where the Dear-
born Recreation Department teaches white sub-
urban housewives how to shoot. Indeed, it haunt's
all the cities of the Midwest, where during and
after the Detroit riots the National Rifle Associa-
tion reported unprecedented numbers of guns being
bought by civilians. It was the shadow that hung
like a storm cloud over Milwaukee last fall, when
Father James Groppi's open-brassing marchers,
chanting Black Power slogans, moved into the
Polish-South Side. Observers agreed that only the
marchers' own restraint, and the presence of a pro-
tective cordon of police cars, prevented a bloody
battle between the marchers and the frightened
and angry Poles.

Police from all over the country attending last
fall's police chiefs' convention focused their main
attention on riot control. There was almost unan-
imous agreement on three points:

1. The best way to control a riot is never to let it
get started. This is primarily the task of the whole
community through its social-welfare agencies.
But it is also the task of the police department, for
the policeman, even though he may only cruise
the streets in a patrol car, sees at first hand the
squatter and anachron of the ghetto, and he is the
first to feel the impact of its anger.

2. When an incident occurs that threatens to explode
into a riot, the police must cool it quickly, using
whatever force is needed. Half-hearted
measures won't work. In both Detroit and Newark
the first response to mob action was slow and cau-
sious. Later, over-reaction, born of fear and anger--
the wild shooting at snipers, real or imagined, the
28
unnecessary killing of looters--left a legacy of
hatred that may take years to dissipate.

3. Whether a riot is to be prevented through the
"civilized" methods of a police-community relations
program, or controlled by force once it is under
way, the police commander must have full and
complete information on the mood of the ghetto,
its goals and aspirations, its anger and frustra-
tions, the identity of its leaders, friendly and un-
friendly, and its potential power to destroy, once
its fury is unleashed.

In every major city in the country today, the
police are trying in various ways, and with vary-
ing degrees of effectiveness, to meet these chal-
lenges. Officers harried by sociologists and histo-
rians on the traditions, the background and
the culture of the Negro race, are going into the
ghettos not as hard-jawed lawmen but as friends.

They reach out not only to be conservative.
professional men, the lawyers, doctors, teachers and real-estate men who have traditionally been the white establishment's main contact in the black community (and who have the most to lose in a riot), but also to the men Ray Girardin calls "those tough black cats that lean against the lamp-post in their undershirts," grieving with hate as a police car cruises by.

"They are the ones we missed," Girardin says, "and they are the ones who wrecked us.

In these community meetings, the officer tries to re-establish the kind of rapport with the people on the block that the old-time foot patrolman had—and that was lost when understaffed police departments put their men in cars. In nearly every large city, storefront offices now enable policemen to act virtually as onlookers for the Negro community. Complaints about the cheating landlord, the merchant, who overcharges, against any situation the citizen feels is unreasonable or unfair, are passed on by the police to the city agencies that can handle them. Accusations against officers charged with being hostile, brutal or indifferent to the Negro community are heard and investigated. To acquaint the young Negro with the problems the officer faces, ghetto youths are invited to ride the police cruisers with the officers on patrol. As the Negro is brought into closer contact with the police, the policeman is brought into closer contact with the Negro.

Police efforts to establish a friendly relationship with the ghetto are matched by their efforts to find out what is going on there. Police intelligence agents infiltrate the Negro community, watching, listening and evaluating the temper of the people. They follow the movements of the more openly hostile Negro leaders, secretly tape their speeches and photographing them for a mug-shot file that will enable uniformed officers to pick them up quickly when trouble starts. "The chief of police must be the best-informed man in town on the causes of civil unrest," says Inspector Harry Fox of Philadelphia, who has 36 men and women prowling the ghettos to keep him informed. On the basis of his intelligence agents' reports, Inspector Fox draws up his plans for defending his city like a battalion commander preparing to defend a fortified position. In all the big cities—New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Miami, Los Angeles, Kansas City, Washington, D.C., the preparations are much the same. In a "war room" at headquarters huge city maps show where protest meetings are being held, where hate literature is being distributed, where an increase in charges of police brutality, or in cases of malicious mischief and vandalism against police cars indicates a growing tension.

Bearing in mind the danger that a crowd may suddenly run wild, the police commander picks the streets beyond which it must not be allowed to go—the thoroughfares lying between the black ghetto and the white business or residential sections. Within these lines he selects the open areas, the school yards, parks and parking lots into which rioters can be herded and held until the leaders can be arrested and their followers quieted.

Outside these perimeters, he chooses the buildings that will house his field-command points, the open spaces where his officers can assemble out of sight of the mob, the areas where their arms and ammunition may be safely cached before they march in to make their show of force, the buildings where temporary bulwarks can be set up to hold the prisoners brought in for booking.

He organizes and trains his special teams. The arrest teams will move into the mob under the protection of armed fellow officers, taking into custody those caught in the act of looting, burning or committing an assault. The transportation teams will man the ready wagons, driving the prisoners to the buildings where clerks drawn from all city departments will book them. The anti-sniper teams and the men who will ride shotgun on the fire trucks receive particularly careful training. In Newark and Detroit last summer, snipers firing from rooftops and apartment windows brought police and Guardsmen to the verge of panic. Their reaction was to shoot at every shadow that moved in a window above street level. In the fury of random fire, a number of presumably innocent people were killed, including a four-year-old girl, shot when a nervous machine-gunner in Detroit mistook the flash of a cigarette lighter for the muzzle burst from a sniper's rifle. The new anti-sniper technique is more deliberate—and more deadly. When a sniper is located, the streets around the building are cleared as much as possible. Expert marksmen, armed with rifles with telescope sights, and assisted by spotters carrying binoculars, take to the rooftops or high windows overlooking the sniper's position. If they spot him, they shoot him. If he can't be seen, tear-gas grenades are fired into the building to flush him out. If this fails, "foot teams" come over the rooftops or are brought in by helicopter. Dressed in body armor and armed with shotguns, they work their way down through the building, kick in doors until the sniper is found. It is a dangerous and largely improvised method of sniper control, but surely superior to wild, indiscriminate firing.

The anti-sniper teams go into action after the shooting has started. If a dangerous situation is properly handled, they may never be needed. Each city now has special quick-strike forces that can move to the scene of trouble fast, to make quick arrests and, if it is hoped, to break up an angry demonstration before it can explode into a riot. In New York it is the 700-man tactical force; in Philadelphia a 300-man strike force held ready in buses parked near trouble spots in times of tension. In St. Louis, Chief Curtis Brostrom can put 60 men on the scene of a riot in 18 minutes, and in Los Angeles a 150-man SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) force breaks into four-man arrest teams armed with rifles and shotguns.

The bulk of a police force, however, still must be trained in more traditional methods of crowd control—the use of the wedge, the diamond, the line-in-chelon formations. By which means mobs may be split, fragmented and dispersed. These tactics, developed by the military for handling unruly crowds in hostile countries, are far from suitable for use against "friendly" citizens, for they employ massed men armed with rifles and bayonets. Yet the police therefore are constantly searching for more effective techniques. Tear gas, for example, can cause a mob to disperse more quickly than can marching men with bayonets and huge rolls of barbed wire, dragged between two jeeps, can rapidly clear a street.

Organizing and arming a semi-military force to fight a war in the streets requires only money and a modicum of administrative ability. Knowing how to employ it wisely is far more difficult. What does a police commander do when the mob is actually in the streets? Does he try to scatter it, or does he contain it behind barricades? In either case, what does he make his show of force? How hard does he strike? To Commissioner Howard Leary of the New York Police Department, whose 28,000-man police force can carpet a troubled area with wall-to-wall cops, this is the crucial command decision, "There are no hard and fast guidelines," he says. "It is purely a matter of feel, of sensitivity to the mood of a crowd; it is subjective, so judgmental, it cannot be spelled out.

Chief Thomas Reddin of Los Angeles, however, does spell it out in his answer, "You use what force is necessary to keep a small incident from flaring..."
'If you shoot him in the back, you will face a murder charge.'

into a full-scale riot, and you use it as quickly as possible,' he says. 'We've been accused of using a sledgehammer to nail a butterfly. But who knows how many riots we've kept from happening? The biggest mistake any police commander can make is to try to handle a dangerous situation with a force of inadequate strength. The sight of a few policemen can inflame the temper of a mob. The sight of great numbers of policemen, coming on in massed ranks, almost invariably will cool it.'

In Chicago, Police Superintendent James B. Conlisk, with 12,000 men under his command, shares the view that the police must come on strong when needed. His patrol division is prepared to protect the Democratic National Convention, which meets there in August, from a threatened Black Power takeover. "We can put six thousand uniformed policemen and detectives around the amphitheater in a matter of hours," he said.

In all the riot-control maneuvers the next step sounds simple. As the police or Guardsmen, wearing gas masks, advance in diamond or wedge formation against the crowd. Armed with rifles, shotguns or extra-length 'riot batons,' they move with a panting stomp and shuffle—left foot forward, right foot brought up. Rioters who run are allowed to go. Those who try to make a stand are picked up by the arrest crews which follow along within the protective arms of the formation.

Suppose, however, the police have made their move a few minutes too late. The mob is out of control. Brick and bottles are flying through plate-glass windows. Lookees are moving in and out of the smashed stores, and rocks and bottles are bouncing off the helmets of the police. What happens then? Does the beleaguered cop or Guardsman shoot, or hold his fire? Should a police officer shoot a man who is drawing back to throw a Molotov cocktail through a window? Should he shoot a looter coming out of a store with an armload of merchandise? To Chief Walter Headley of Miami, the answer is simple enough. "When the looting starts," he says, "the shooting starts."

To Commander Spina in Newark, even though he keeps a shotgun behind his desk, the answer is no. "I don't believe in taking a human life in defense of property alone," he says. "If the rioter's action menaces the officer's life, or the life of someone else, then shooting him is justified."

To Chief Herbert Jenkins of Atlanta, it is a matter of confrontation and timing. "If you order him to halt, and he keeps coming on at you, you are justified in shooting him." Chief Jenkins tells his men: "But if he breaks and runs, you had better hold your fire. If you shoot him in the back, you will face a murder charge."

To avoid making this life-or-death decision, police departments, while still putting their faith in the .45 Special revolver and the riot shotgun, are looking with almost desperate eagerness for some non-lethal weapon that will render a rioter helpless without killing him. The most promising device to appear so far is an innocent-looking black Squirt gun, about the size of a can of shaving cream, which propels a stream of super-tear gas for a distance of 20 feet. Sold under the trade name Chemical Mace, it contains an ingredient that, when sprayed on human skin, sets up a chemical reaction affecting the nerve ends. The victim hit in the face by Mace goes down instantly, gasping, choking, his eyes, nose and throat burning as if on fire. Mace is not available to private citizens, but some 3,000 local, state and federal law-enforcement agencies are now using it. "It ought to be called 'Instant Apathy,'" said a policeman in New Haven, where Mace was used effectively last summer. "A man may be trying to wipe up the sidewalk with you. You give him a little squirt, and he sits right down in the street and cries. For half an hour he is as helpless as a newborn baby. After that he's OK."

Since riots are often triggered by arrests in which force may be used, Mace is looked upon as a great improvement over the belly club as a peacekeeping device. The officer can gas the prisoner the moment he starts to resist, and be gone with him before a crowd can gather. The N.A.A.C.P., which at first opposed the use of Mace on the grounds that it had not been sufficiently tested, now agrees that it is far more humane than the belly club or the gun.

Since Mace is effective only at relatively short range, there is still great need for a non-lethal device that can be used at a distance. At Emory University in Atlanta, Dr. William E. Conner is experimenting on student volunteers, shooting them with air guns which fire hypodermic darts loaded with tranquilizing drugs. The ideal drug has not yet been found. The drugs that act quickly enough (such as novocaine and curare derivatives) are not absolutely safe for use against humans," said Dr. Conner, "and those that are safe do not act quickly enough."

One ingredient which acts quickly and is believed to be safe enough for field use is vinegar. When injected into a muscle, it causes a sudden knotting, an instant charley horse. It is also so painful that Dr. Conner has not been able to test it fully. His volunteers disappeared after the first one shot with vinegar uttered a yell of anguish and announced that he felt as if he had been stung by a wasp the size of an eagle. Dr. Conner is now experimenting with apo-morphine, a nausea-inducing drug. In experiments on himself, Dr. Conner discovered that it takes 2 1/2 minutes to make the victim so sick he can no longer function—not fast enough in a riot situation.

Many of the non-lethal devices tested for crowd control sound as if they might have been invented by some demented TV comedian. A substance called RoTrol, nicknamed "Instant Banana Peel," which sprinkled on the sidewalk in powder form, and then wetted down, makes the surface so slippery that a rioter (or a policeman) cannot run, walk or even stand on it. A noisemaker device called a Curdler utters a screech of such brain-numbing intensity that the thought process of whom it is aimed at is obliterated. Nickle nuts that may be fired over the heads of a crowd, like those used by wildlife ranchers to trap fowls of sitting ducks, have been tested. So have water pumps which douse a crowd with dyes or evil-smelling chemicals, for the purpose of later identification. Smoke has been found to be useful as a psychological weapon. "It leaves a man all alone," a police officer said. "If you smoke in the smoke, he's not a part of the wolf pack any more. Also, a man can't riot when he can't see.

There has also been considerable talk of making weapons less lethal. When possible, the cop is supposed to fire his gun into the pavement behind the head of a rioter—a technique called skip-shooting—which peppers the rioter's legs with flattened pellets that do not penetrate skin. The Institute for Defense Analyses, a private think-tank hired to do a study on weapons for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement, has recommended that the use of the bayonet be abandoned entirely, and that, instead, the officer be equipped with a three-foot riot baton, for use as a prod instead of a club, or a plastic bullet with a can of Mace in the handle. The battery-powered cattle prod is not popular with policemen.
since it got such a bad press when used in the South. But many experts still consider it the most humane device yet developed to break up a mob.

The search for better offensive weapons is matched by the effort to develop protective devices that will enable the officer to function in a riot situation without being killed or maimed by the rioter's traditional weapons—bricks, bottles, concrete blocks, broken plate glass or the jagged halves of old 78-rpm records hurled at a cop's skull or face. The armored personnel carriers the cities have been buying are equipped to carry up to 15 men into the middle of a riot, trundling through the streets, firing tear-gas grenades, squirting gas from nozzles, or laying tear-gas hoses. One 32,000-pound monster on display at Kansas City can lob gas grenades through apartment-house windows 200 feet above the street, an anti-sniper tactic. It is also equipped with the brain-numbing Curdiller, and carries its own foam to extinguish Molotov cocktails tossed under it.

Ceramic body armor, originally designed to protect helicopter crews fighting in Vietnam, is now available to police, as are hand-held shields that look much like those once used by Caesar's centurions. Wearing a helmet that will turn a bullet, a visor to protect his eyes, steel guards, an aluminum athletic supporter and shoes with steel protective plates in the toes, the modern police officer goes on riot duty padded like a hockey goalie, and looks like a man from Mars.

As the police arm and armor themselves in preparation for a troubled summer, there is a growing suspicion in some quarters that the tactics of the angry minority may be switching from direct confrontation to guerrilla warfare.

"Rioting," writes Dr. Morris Janowitz, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, "appears to be giving way to more specific, more premeditated, and more regularized uses of force...outbursts it is almost appropriate to describe as political violence or political terror."

The Rev. Andrew J. Young, executive vice-president of Dr. Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, put this same judgment in plainer terms when he said that "Young Negroes of high intelligence" are developing programs of "planned, systematic violence and the application of guerrilla-war techniques in urban America."

The black revolutionaries are determined and angry men. And they are not stupid. The lessons of the past winter, when police and Guardsmen, better trained and equipped, quickly quelled riots in a half-dozen cities, would not have been lost on them. It was not lost, at least, on Muhammad Ali, once known as Cassius Clay. Rioting in the streets, said the former heavyweight champion, is suicidal, "like a bull trying to fight a freight train."

There is a possibility, then, that rioting and destruction on the scale of Newark and Detroit may not be seen again. There is little likelihood, however, that there will soon be racial peace.

"We will have our revenge," said Rap Brown, after a bloody affair at Orangeburg, S.C., in February left three students dead and many wounded. "How?" he was asked. "That is for you to find out," Brown said.